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Abstract. Secure systems for voting, exams, auctions and conference
paper management are theorised to address the same problem, that of
secure evaluations. In support of such a unifying theory comes a model
for Secure Evaluation Systems (SES), which offers innovative common
grounds to understand all four groups. For example, all rest on submis-
sions, respectively votes, test answers, bids and papers, which are to
be evaluated and ultimately ranked. A taxonomy for all groups is ad-
vanced to provide a comparative understanding of the various systems.
The taxonomy is built according to the type of submissions and the type
of evaluation.
The uniformity of the security requirements across all groups offers addi-
tional validation, and this is an innovative finding in the direction, cur-
rently unexplored, of a common system design. Still, the requirements
may variously shape up. For example, while voter privacy is normally
required forever, anonymity of the submissions is required until after
the marking/evaluation phase for the test answers of an exam, for the
(sealed) bids of an auction, and for the papers submitted to a conference.
1 Introduction
There are at least four groups of secure systems that are widely used at present.
These are respectively for voting, exams, auctions and conference paper manage-
ment. Each group has been extensively studied so far. To advance an example
system per group, we mention Helios for voting [1], Remark! for exams [2], the
protocol presented by Curtis et al. for auctions [3] and Confichair for conference
paper management [4].
This idea paper unfolds our theory that all groups can be unified at an ab-
stract level. The theory is supported by three main pillars. One is a formal model
for Secure Evaluation Systems (SES), whose main elements are the submitters,
the authorities, the submissions and an evaluation function (§2). The model is a
tuple that can be instantiated over each group or a specific system, thus offering
a benchmark for a contrastive assessment of the various systems.
Another pillar in support of our unifying theory is a taxonomy for the groups
of systems based upon the type of submissions and the type of evaluation (§3).
For example, the taxonomy supports the claim that exam systems and conference
systems are very similar, although only exams may seek submissions of type
ordered choice, namely a ranked list.
The third pillar is a requirement elicitation process across the four groups of
systems (§4). It is found that all systems have in common various flavours of au-
thentication, non-repudiation, fairness and privacy. In particular, receipt-freeness
and coercion-resistance, traditionally spelled out for voting, are interpreted for
the first time for exams, indicating the impossibility for an examinee to prove
the ownership of her test until after the marking, even with the collaboration of
a coercing examining authority. By contrast, after the marking terminates, the
system should allow the examinee to publicly leverage the mark for her test.
2 A Model for Secure Evaluation Systems
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) is a widely studied area of cryptog-
raphy aimed at the distributed, privacy preserving computation of a function
[5]. It means that all participating players will provide inputs that are needed to
compute the function, whose output may be made public; however, the computa-
tion must not reveal anything about the inputs, hence preserve the privacy of the
players. This model can be reviewed to emphasise the details of secure evaluation
systems. It is useful to further detail our four groups of secure systems.
Voting system is a method for making a decision or expressing an opinion,
usually following discussions, debates or election campaigns. The submissions
consist of a set of preferences (votes) over some options (candidate, decisions,
etc.). The evaluation consists of a tallyng algorithm that outputs a ranking
of candidates (or a winning candidate).
Exam system is a method for evaluating candidates according to their knowl-
edge or skill. The submissions consist of a set of tests over some options
(open-ended questions, multiple-questions, etc.). The evaluation consists of
a marking algorithm that outputs a ranking of tests (or a winning test).
Auction system is a method for buying and selling goods or services by of-
fering them up for bidding, then taking the bids, and finally selling to the
winning bidder. The submissions consist of a set of offers (bids) over some
options (goods, prices, etc.). The evaluation consists of an algorithm that
outputs a ranking of bids (or a winning bid).
Conference system is a method for managing the papers to be presented at
a conference and often published in a book of proceedings. The submissions
consist of a set of papers, which are often anonymised. The evaluation consist
of an algorithm that outputs a ranking of papers (or a winning paper).
This description underlines clear similarities among all groups, such as that
they all aim at producing a ranking. However, the evaluation used for the raking
is inherently different. While there is no notion of “correctness” of a vote in
democracy, there clearly is such a notion for test answers. Also, while all bids
are potentially correct once they are in the right format, correctness of a research
paper also is meaningful.
An informal definition can be given to identify the subject matter.
Definition 1 (SES — Informal). A Secure Evaluation System is a SMPC
system that computes a function termed evaluation function securely. Its players
can be partitioned as submitters, who contribute submissions, and authorities,
who contribute administration.
A formal model can then be built to capture a SES abstractly. The model
rests on a set S of submitters a set s of submissions and a set A of authorities. The
players treat the submissions by means of a set T of tasks, such as sending the
submissions or entering data in a computer. The specific list of tasks is normally
understood as the protocol definition underlying the system. The tasks may
express important features of a SES, for example as an electronic protocol if the
tasks occur over computing devices, or as a face-to-face protocol if the tasks take
place traditionally, de visu. Both submitters and authorities may misbehave to
obtain an advantage maliciously. This admits a threat model, namely a set of
malicious tasks Tt.
The evaluation function f, which may be jointly computed by the players,
should satisfy a set Rf of functional requirements. The privacy preservation pre-
requisite can be generalised as a set Rs of security and privacy.
A SES can thus be formalised as a tuple.
Definition 2 (SES — Formal). A Secure Evaluation System, at the formal
level, is a tuple SES “ xS,A, s,T,Tt, f,Rf ,Rsy such that:
– S is a set of submitters;
– A is a set of authorities;
– s is a set of submissions;
– T is a set of tasks, which the players carry out;
– Tt is a threat model;
– f is an evaluation function, which the players may jointly compute;
– Rf is a set of functional requirements;
– Rs is a set of security requirements.
The model can be easily instantiated over a target secure system of our four
chosen groups. We instantiate it over the groups themselves, building a table
that expresses an inclusion relation, Table 1. Therefore, the table is incomplete
because it only provides a limited set of examples, but offers a compact, uni-
fying workbench. This highlights a minor ambiguity in the terminology, that a
candidate in voting is someone who can be voted for, while a candidate in exam
is someone who is examined.
It must be emphasised that all groups of systems are aimed at computing
a ranking. This underlines the competitive nature of the problems that all sys-
tems address. Also the Rs line is limited, providing just one obvious security
requirement per group, but a more comprehensive analysis will follow (§4).
3 A Taxonomy for Secure Evaluation Systems
We build a taxonomy based upon the types of submissions and the type of
evaluation. Submissions can be of three types.
Ď Voting Exam Auction Conference
S voters candidates (examinees) bidders authors
A talliers, officials invigilators, examiners auctioneer program chair
s votes test answers bids research papers
T vote casting answering questions bidding paper writing
Tt voting twice over-marking bid alteration de-anonymisation
f candidate ranking test ranking bid ranking paper ranking
Rf efficiency efficiency efficiency efficiency
Rs voter privacy anonymous marking bid sealing anonymous reviewer
Table 1. An incomplete demonstration of the SES formal model
3.1 Types of submissions
Single-choice submission allows the submitter to select one of the possible
options. In voting, this submission type reflects Single-Mark Ballot type
where each voter chooses one candidate. In exams, it reflects both open-
ended tests and those multiple-choice tests that only demand one answer.
In auctions, it reflects Dutch and Sealed first-price auction types where each
bidder may only put in one bid. In conferences, this type of submissions is
the standard one.
Check-All-That-Applies (CATA) submission allows the submitter to se-
lect more than one of the possible options, precisely all those that the submit-
ter deems appropriate. In voting, this reflects Approvals ballot type where
each voter can select any number of candidates of her choice. In exams, it re-
flects tests with more than one correct answer. In auctions, it reflects English
auction types where bidders can submit multiple bids to get the standing
bid. In conferences, it may be interpreted as the submission of more than
one paper by the same author list.
Ordered-choice submission allows the submitter to order the options accord-
ing to a stated criterion. In voting, this submission type reflects Rank and
Score ballot types where each voter produces a hierarchy of the candidates.
In exams, it reflects scale format tests, where submissions are based on a
rating scale. In auctions, it reflects Combinatorial auction type where each
bidder can place bids on combinations of discrete items. In conferences, this
type of submissions does not seem to be used.
3.2 Types of evaluation
The tasks for evaluating the submissions managed through a SES may, in turn,
be carried out in three alternative ways, depending on who performs them (while
meeting the requirements in Rs):
Authority evaluation prescribes the submissions to be evaluated by a set of
dedicated authorities.
Peer evaluation sees the evaluation of the submissions being performed by a
set of peers of the submitter’s. Also in this case, anonymity may contribute to
the submitter’s trust in the peers for the sake of evaluation; for example, the
submissions might be anonymised. Additionally, the evaluation may extend,
as prescribed by Rf of the specific protocol, to the answers of a subset or all
of the submitters, as we shall see below.
Self evaluation limits the evaluation to be carried out by the individual sub-
mitter, namely each individual can perform the evaluation that meets the
requirements stated in Rf . Soundness and fairness of such an evaluation are
not obvious so will have to derive from the specific tasks of the system.
3.3 Taxonomy
With all the details provided above, a taxonomy can be built for secure evalu-
ation systems. The taxonomy is in Table 2: a cell mentions a group of secure
systems when we are aware that there exists at least one system in the group
that exhibits the specific combination of submission and evaluation types that
the cell pinpoints.
Evaluation
Authority Peer Self
Submission
Single-choice voting auction exam conf. exam conf. voting auction
CATA voting auction exam conf. exam conf. voting
Ordered-choice voting auction exam exam
Table 2. A taxonomy for Secure Evaluation Systems
Authority evaluation. Most SES’s feature an authority that takes care of the
evaluation process. All democracies elect holders of offices by voting systems that
have tallying authorities. This applies to single-choice, CATA, and ordered-choice
types of submissions. In electronic voting, some systems have been proposed to
distribute the trust among different authorities. For example, one such system
is Helios [1]. Similarly, in most classic auctions, the auctioneer is the authority
who declares the winning bid. E-bay is a popular example of electronic auction
with a CATA type of submission. The auction system by Curtis et al. [3] fits any
submission type. In entrance examinations, authorities normally produce the list
of admitted candidate. Some effort to distribute the trust on such authorities
has been discussed in a recent proposal of a secure exam system [2]. Notably, the
latter fits any submission type. In Easychair, the program chair acts as authority
and decides the list of accepted papers. Easychair accepts submissions of more
than one paper by the same author list, hence supports both single-choice and
CATA submission types.
Peer evaluation. Peer evaluation is peculiar to conferences and exams. For
example, in MOOCs homeworks are peer-reviewed. To our knowledge, neither
voting nor auction systems have been proposed so far with this feature.
Self evaluation. Kiayias and Yung [6] introduced the notion of self-tallying
voting for single-choice submission type, in which the result can be tallied and
verified by anybody. Hao et al. [7] proposed a different system that supports an
approval ballot type, hence a CATA submission. No exam systems today support
ordered-choice with self evaluation. Recent works on smart contract technology,
such as AuctionHouse [8] seems to lead to auctions with self-declaration of win-
ning bids enforced by the use of blockchains. To our knowledge, there is no work
on exam with self-evaluation, although the use of smart contracts may favour
the construction of such a kind of systems.
4 Requirement Elicitation for Secure Evaluation Systems
We now wonder whether it is also possible to find similarities among the SES
multi-objective security goals. More specifically, given any security goal of a
group of SES systems, can we find a similar interpretation in each of the other
groups? History of secure systems tell us that it is unfeasible to list and freeze
all the security goals of a system because people’s needs may change over time,
hence the system’s requirements tend to change as well. However, while we may
not reach a definitive answer to our question, we may find a temporary answer by
considering the main requirements that are popular nowadays. In our analysis,
we focus on classic authentication, non-repudiation, fairness, and privacy goals.
Authentication. Data origin Authentication naturally maps to the authen-
tication of the submissions of a SES system. Data origin authentication is a
common goal with the same interpretation in voting, exams, auctions, and con-
ferences. It is normally expected that any evaluation algorithm considers only
inputs submitted by eligible parties: only ballots cast by eligible voters should be
recorded in a voting system; only test answers originated with eligible candidates
should be marked in an exam; only bids put by registered bidders should be con-
sidered in an auction; only papers by registered authors should be considered as
valid submissions to a conference.
In the same way, data origin authentication is also expected for authenti-
cating the outcome of the evaluation in each of the systems. It means that the
rankings in all four groups of systems are generated by the corresponding set
of official authorities. Note that data origin authentication does not imply the
correctness of the evaluation, which means that the outcome derives by correct
execution of the evaluation function. Data origin authentication guarantees that
such a function is fed with all and only eligible submissions. However, correct-
ness of the evaluation is a desired goal for each of our systems, and has a similar
interpretation across each of them.
Non-repudiation. An interpretation of non-repudiation [9] is the impossi-
bility for submitters to deny their participation. In voting, it means that a voter
cannot deny to have participated in an election. The same clearly applies to ex-
ams with candidates, to auctions with bidders and to conferences with papers.
However, auctions support an additional interpretation in which non-repudia-
tion may signify the impossibility for a bidder to claim that she did not submit
the winning bid. A similar interpretation is hard to find in voting, in which the
very opposite is actually desirable, namely that a voter cannot prove the way she
voted (receipt freeness). We observe that in exams a test should eventually be
linked to the corresponding author in order to assign a mark to each examinee,
hence non-repudiation applies to exams.
Another instantiation of non-repudiation regards the reception of submis-
sions. This interpretation applies to voting, exams, auctions and conferences, so
that no authority can successfully deny having received valid submissions.
Fairness. As regards submissions, fairness means that choices are submitted
independently from other submissions. In voting, it means that no voter can
be influenced by votes already cast. In most auction types, submitted offers
should not influence subsequent offers. However, this interpretation of fairness
obviously does not apply for English auctions, in which bidders submit new
offers to displace the standing bid. From a bidding strategy point of view, if
we consider the submission of a bidder as the final bid she wishes to offer for
an auction, we can see our fairness interpretation in English auctions as well.
Fairness is of utmost importance in exams and means that candidates should
answer their test based on their knowledge and skills. An additional fairness
goal exists for exam and can be named marking fairness: it prescribes that tests
should be marked independently from the identity of their authors. Note that
marks are not the outcome of exam’s function evaluation but they rather are
inputs to the function to calculate the rank of the tests. Marks can be associated
to weights in voting and auctions, in which votes or bids have different weights.
Such interpretation, however, requires weights to depend on the identity of the
submitters. Thus, an interpretation similar to marking fairness is hard to find
in voting and auctions. By contrast, fairness in conferences abides by the same
interpretation as for exams.
Privacy. Privacy goals have seen many interpretations. If we look at the
privacy of the submission, the interpretation in voting is that the system does
not reveal how a voter voted. The same applies to the pairs examinee/test,
bidder/bid and author/paper. Note that this definition is strongly related to the
definition of fairness discussed above, and the same considerations made about
English auctions apply here. Voting systems normally require vote privacy to
hold even after the evaluation. The winning bid is normally revealed in auctions,
still the identity of the bidder may not be disclosed. The same applies for exams
in which the right to publicly disclose the link of a test with its author is left
to the examinee. By contrast, this link is routinely disclosed in conferences,
where the author is normally required to attend and present the accepted paper.
Further differences among those systems find a place in specific definitions of
privacy. Strong privacy definitions in voting state that a voter cannot prove the
way she voted (receipt-freeness) even if the voter collaborates with the coercer
(coercion-resistance) [10]. Similar strong privacy definitions are less meaningful
in auctions since winning bids are normally announced publicly. Also information
revealed through other channels, such as who is the (new) owner of the auctioned
good or service, would disclose if a bidder sent a winning or a losing offer.
In exams, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance are meaningful through the
marking phase and can be seen as stronger definitions of marking fairness. In
particular, receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance are two detailed instances of
anonymous marking, in which tests are marked while ignoring their authors.
They signify that an examinee should not be able to prove the ownership of her
test until after the marking (receipt-freeness) even if the examinee collaborates
with the coercer, e.g. the examiner (coercion-resistance). However, the possibility
of a covert channel between examinee and examiner should be ruled out. Privacy
over conferences can be interpreted much the same way as with exams.
Although we found many similar security goal interpretations among SES
systems, there may still be differences in other clusters, such as verifiability and
accountability [11]. The requirement elicitation needs to be expanded also over
such clusters to fully substantiate a putative claim that all systems state the
same security requirements.
5 Conclusions
Secure systems for voting, exams, auctions and conferences have never been
analysed comparatively before. Our unifying theory claims that this is possible,
and our supporting model confirms their similarities. Our taxonomy favours
a comparative understanding of the various systems. The traditional security
requirements of authentication, non-repudiation, fairness and privacy apply to
all four groups. The next step is to focus on either one of the three introduced
pillars, i.e., formal model, taxonomy, or requirement elicitation, and to study it
thoroughly. For example, it would be interesting to study those group of systems,
such as surveys, that normally do not produce a ranking.
A readily-exploitable value of this work is a deep understanding of the secu-
rity requirements of each system; this is made possible precisely by their argu-
mentation across the various groups. An additional value is that it may inspire
a combination of the research efforts that are currently spent in each individual
group towards solving more effectively than before what seems to be a same
problem, that of secure evaluation.
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